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 
Abstract—Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an innovative 
quantum communications protocol which exploits the laws of 
quantum mechanics to generate unconditionally secure 
cryptographic keying material between two geographically 
separated parties. The unique nature of QKD shows promise for 
high-security applications such as those found in banking, 
government, and military environments. However, QKD systems 
contain implementation non-idealities which can negatively 
impact their performance and security. In particular, QKD 
systems often employ the decoy state protocol to improve system 
throughput and mitigate the threat of Photon Number Splitting 
(PNS) attacks. In this work, a detailed analysis of the decoy state 
protocol is conducted which optimizes both performance in terms 
of quantum throughput and security with respect to detecting 
PNS attacks. The results of this study uniquely demonstrate that 
the decoy state protocol can ensure PNS attacks are detected with 
high confidence, while maximizing the system’s secure key 
generation rate at no additional cost. Additionally, 
implementation security guidance is provided for QKD system 
developers and users. 
 
Index Terms—Quantum Key Distribution, Decoy State 
Protocol, Photon Number Splitting Attack, Implementation 
Security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
uantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a revolutionary  
quantum communications protocol which provides the 
means for two geographically separated parties to generate 
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unlimited amounts of unconditionally secure symmetric 
keying material. Unlike conventional key distribution 
techniques, the security of QKD systems rests on the laws of 
quantum mechanics and not on computational complexity [1]. 
In theory, these attributes make QKD well suited for high-
security applications such as banking, government, and 
military environments. However, QKD is a nascent 
technology with implementation non-idealities and practical 
engineering limitations which can negatively impact the 
system’s performance and security [2]. For example, in order 
to mitigate implementation vulnerabilities commercially 
viable QKD systems (i.e., those which balance cost, 
performance, and security towards affordability [3]) often 
employ the decoy state protocol to detect Photon Number 
Splitting (PNS) attacks and improve system performance [4]. 
While the decoy state protocol is well studied with respect 
to unconditionally secure key generation (see background for 
details), this work uniquely examines the protocol’s ability to 
both detect PNS attacks and maximize quantum throughput. 
The results of this study: (i) provide an optimization of the 
decoy state protocol which maximizes secret key generation 
rates and the protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks with high 
confidence; (ii) demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
optimization to detect PNS attacks; (iii) offer implementation 
security engineering considerations for QKD system designers 
and users; and (iv) present a repeatable methodology for 
studying quantum communication issues related to non-ideal 
protocol implementations. 
This article is organized as follows: first an introduction to 
QKD is provided with an emphasis on security vulnerabilities, 
the PNS attack, and the decoy state protocol. In Section III, 
the research method is explained, including a comprehensive 
listing of decoy state enabled QKD systems. Section IV details 
the decoy state protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks across 
40 operationally relevant decoy state protocol configurations. 
Based on these results, an optimization of the protocol is 
presented and demonstrated along with implementation 
security recommendations. Lastly, conclusions and future 
work are discussed in Section V. For security specialists 
desiring to further understand QKD, please see [5], [6], [7]. 
For comprehensive physics-based reviews, please see [1], [4]. 
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II. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD)  
The genesis of QKD traces back to the late 1960s, when 
Wiesner first proposed the idea of encoding information on 
polarized photons using two conjugate bases [8]. In 1984, 
Bennett and Brassard extended this idea by introducing the 
first QKD protocol, known as “BB84,” to generate shared 
secret keying material between two parties [9]. Today, QKD is 
gaining attention as an important development in the 
cybersecurity solution space because of its ability to generate 
unlimited amounts of symmetric keying material for use with 
the One-Time-Pad (OTP) – the only known encryption 
algorithm to achieve perfect secrecy [10], [11]. In this way, 
QKD enables unbreakable communications and has inspired 
research efforts across Asia, Europe, and North America [12]. 
A. The BB84 QKD Protocol 
 While there are many competing QKD protocols, BB84 is 
primarily considered in this work because it remains a popular 
implementation choice and is relatively easy to understand [1]. 
Fig. 1 illustrates a notional QKD system configured to 
securely generate the secure shared key 𝐾, which is used to 
encrypt/decrypt sensitive data, voice, or video 
communications. The QKD system consists of a sender 
“Alice,” a receiver “Bob,” a quantum channel (i.e., an optical 
fiber or direct line of sight free space path), and a classical 
channel (i.e., a conventional networked connection). Alice is 
shown with a laser source configured to generate and prepare 
single photons, known as quantum bits or “qubits.” The 
encoded photons are then transmitted over the quantum 
channel to Bob, whom measures them using specialized single 
photon detectors. This exchange of encoded single photons is 
described by the BB84 protocol. 
 
Fig. 1. A Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system context diagram. The 
sender “Alice” and receiver “Bob” generate shared secret key 𝐾 for use in 
data encryption/decryption. 
Table I describes the BB84 protocol as a prepare and 
measure protocol where Alice encodes photons in one of four 
polarization states (e.g., ↔, ↕, ⤢, or ⤡) according to a 
randomly selected bit value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair 
↔, ↕ or ⊗ for the pair ⤢, ⤡). Once Alice randomly prepares 
the photons, they are sent to Bob where he measures each 
photon using a randomly selected basis (⊕ or ⊗). If Alice’s 
encoding and Bob’s decoding bases match, the photon’s bit 
value is read correctly with a high probability. Otherwise a 
random result occurs (i.e., equal likelihood of a 0 or 1). This is 
due to the inherent uncertainty in the measurement of an 
unknown (i.e., a randomly encoded) single photon. 
More specifically, the security of the BB84 QKD quantum 
communications protocol is based on uncertainty of the 
measurement result when using two conjugate bases 
(i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to randomly prepare and measure photons [13]. 
For example, during an intercept-resend attack anyone 
attempting to listen on the quantum channel must randomly 
select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce 
detectable errors. This will increase the protocol’s measured 
Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) and if the QBER ever 
exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% 
[4]), the secret key distribution process is aborted (or 
restarted) as it is assumed an eavesdropper is active on the 
quantum channel. 
TABLE I 
EXAMPLE BB84 PROTOCOL 
Alice Prepares Bob Measures 
Bit Basis 
Prepared 
State Basis Result 
0 ⊕ |↔⟩ ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕⟩ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |↔⟩ ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ |↕⟩ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢⟩ ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡⟩ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢⟩ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡⟩ ⊗ 1 
B. Vulnerabilities in Protocol Implementation 
BB84 security proofs assume several idealities, including 
perfect on-demand single photon sources, lossless quantum 
transmission, perfect transmitter-receiver basis alignment, and 
perfect single photon detection [14]. However, these security 
assumptions are not valid when building real-world systems 
which deviate from theoretical protocols [2]. For example, 
reliable on-demand single photon sources are not currently 
available nor are they expected in the near term [1]. Therefore, 
most QKD systems attenuate classical laser pulses down from 
millions of photons to weak coherent pulses with an average 
photon number less than one. More specifically, the number of 
photons contained in the pulse is represented using a Poisson 
distribution with a low (i.e., <1) Mean Photon Number (MPN) 
𝑃(𝑛|𝜇) =
𝜇𝑛𝑒−𝜇
𝑛!
  (1) 
where 𝜇 is the average number of photons in a pulse (i.e., 𝜇 is 
the MPN) and 𝑛 represents the number of photons in the pulse 
(i.e., 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N). For example, with a typical MPN, 
𝜇 = 0.5, nearly 60% of the pulses have zero photons, 30% of 
the pulses have one photon, and 9% of the pulses have two or 
more photons. This means nearly 23% of the non-empty 
pulses emitted by Alice are non-ideal multiphoton pulses 
which leak information about the “unconditionally secure” 
QKD-generated secret key to eavesdroppers. This introduces a 
significant security vulnerability into the QKD protocol. 
C. Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attacks  
The PNS attack is a powerful attack designed to take 
advantage of the multiphoton vulnerability in order to obtain a 
full copy of Alice and Bob’s shared secret key bits without 
introducing errors and thus increasing the QBER [15], [16]. A 
brief introduction to the PNS attack is given here, with a 
detailed, yet easily understandable engineering-oriented 
explanation available in [17]. 
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Fig. 2 provides a simplified depiction of the eavesdropper 
“Eve” conducting a PNS attack against the QKD system (i.e., 
Alice and Bob). In accordance with QKD security proofs, Eve 
is an all-powerful adversary limited only by the laws of 
quantum mechanics [4]. She is allowed full control of the 
quantum channel to introduce losses or errors and may 
eavesdrop on, but not fabricate, messages exchanged on the 
classical channel. In order to conduct the PNS attack, Eve 
replaces the quantum channel with a quantum teleportation 
channel which enables the lossless transmission of photons 
from Alice to Bob using the properties of entangled quantum 
systems [18]. In order to avoid obvious disclosure, a 
geographically separated Eve′ entity is also required to 
regulate the lossless transmission of photons as to not exceed 
Bob’s expected detection rate. 
For each pulse Alice generates, Eve performs a specialized 
Quantum Non-Demolition (QND) measurement to determine 
the number of photons in each pulse 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N [19]. 
If 𝑛 ≤ 1, Eve blocks the pulse and sends nothing to Bob. If 
𝑛 ≥ 2, Eve splits one photon from the pulse and stores it in 
her quantum memory. She then quantum teleports the 
remaining 𝑛 − 1 photons to Bob. This attack scheme allows 
Eve to store an identical encoded copy of each photon sent to 
Bob without introducing additional errors (which are typically 
used for detecting eavesdroppers). Once Alice and Bob 
complete their quantum exchange, they must announce 
measurement basis information over the classical channel 
where Eve is able to listen. Eve can then correctly measure 
each stored photon, and thus, obtain a complete copy of the 
QKD-generated “secure” key bits. 
 
Fig. 2. The eavesdropper (Eve and Eve′) is shown conducting a Photon 
Number Splitting (PNS) attack against the QKD system (Alice and Bob). 
D. The Decoy State Protocol 
 In 2003, the decoy state protocol was introduced to detect 
PNS attacks [20]. It was quickly improved upon in a series of 
works [21], [22], [23], [24], [25]; and is now widely employed 
in commercially viable QKD systems such as Toshiba’s 
record holding system [26] and the world’s largest QKD 
network [27]. In particular, the decoy state protocol is 
advantageous as it is relatively easy to implement (low cost), 
increases the system’s distributed secret key rate (high 
performance), and mitigates the PNS attack (high security). 
 As described by Ma et al., the decoy state protocol extends 
the BB84 protocol by configuring Alice to randomly transmit 
three types of pulses: 1. Signal; 2. Decoy; and 3. Vacuum as 
described in Table II [22]. Thus, Alice randomly generates 
signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses according to their prescribed 
occurrence percentages and respective MPNs where the state 
of each pulse must be indistinguishable to Eve (i.e., identical 
pulse shape, wavelength, duration, etc.) in order to maintain 
integrity of the security protocol. Eve cannot know a priori the 
type of pulse received during quantum exchange, the only 
information available to her is each pulse’s specific number of 
photons 𝑛 = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N which she determines using her 
QND measurement. 
TABLE II 
EXAMPLE DECOY STATE PROTOCOL CONFIGURATION 
State PURPOSE MPN 
Occurrence 
Percentage 
Signal 
𝜇 
The signal state is used to generate 
secret key and facilitates improved 
performance by using a higher MPN 
(i.e., 0.5 is greater than the value 0.1 
typically employed in non-decoy state 
protocol QKD systems). 
0.5 70% 
Decoy 
𝜈 
The decoy state is used to increase the 
likelihood of detecting unauthorized 
eavesdropping on the quantum channel 
through statistical differential analysis 
with the signal state. 
0.1 20% 
Vacuum 
𝑌0 
The vacuum state is used to determine 
the noise on the quantum channel 
known as the “dark count” (i.e., 
detections when no photons are sent). 
0.0 10% 
E. Unconditionally Secure Key Generation 
While the decoy state protocol was introduced to detect 
PNS attacks, to date it has been primarily used to increase 
unconditionally secure key rates. More specifically, decoy 
state research has focused on understanding and bounding 
Alice’s single photon generation, 𝑄1, as it pertains to secret 
key generation 𝑅 [22] 
𝑅 ≥  𝑞{𝑄1[1 − 𝐻2(𝑒1)] −  𝑄𝜇  𝑓(𝐸μ)𝐻2(𝐸μ)} (2) 
where 𝑞 is the protocol efficiency (e.g., <1), 𝑄1 is the 
estimated single photon contribution, 𝑒1is the estimated error 
rate of single photon detections, 𝑄𝜇 is the signal state gain, 𝐸𝜇 
is the signal state QBER, 𝑓(𝐸𝜇) is the error reconciliation 
efficiency, and 𝐻({𝐸𝜇 , 𝑒1}) is Shannon’s binary information 
function [11]. This additional complexity is necessary because 
only pulses emitted by Alice containing a single photon (i.e., 
𝑄1), those known as “tagged bits,” can contribute to the QKD-
generated unconditionally secure key 𝑅 [22]. 
 In their 2005 work, Ma et al. optimized the signal state 
MPN (𝜇 = 0.5) to maximize the number of single photon 
pulses generated by Alice (i.e., 𝑄1) [22]. Following this 
seminal work, many others have studied the single photon 
bound 𝑄1 to account for fluctuations in laser sources [28], 
[29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39] and 
finite key size statistics [25], [40], [41], [42]. In addition to 
these theoretically focused works, several practically-oriented 
experimental demonstrations have been accomplished as 
detailed in Table III (discussed in Section III). 
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F. Detecting PNS Attacks 
The decoy state protocol is designed to detect PNS attacks 
by comparing the signal and decoy states during quantum 
exchange, and specifically, the photon number dependent 
yields of the signal state 𝑌𝑛
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙
 and the decoy state 𝑌𝑛
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
 are 
examined with the security condition [21] 
𝑌𝑛
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙
= 𝑌𝑛
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
 (3) 
where 𝑌𝑛 (signal or decoy) represents the conditional 
probability that Bob detects a pulse given Alice sent an 
𝑛-photon pulse. Formally, 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛 − 𝑌0𝜂𝑛 = 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛 
where 𝑌0 is the measured dark count rate and                       
𝜂𝑛 = 1 − (1 − 𝜂)
𝑛 is the photon number specific efficiency 
based on the number of photons, 𝑛, in each pulse and the 
measured quantum efficiency 𝜂 when treating each photon 
independently. Lastly, the joint probability 𝑌0𝜂𝑛 is disregarded 
because it is insignificant compared to 𝑌0 and 𝜂𝑛.  
Under normal operational conditions (i.e., when no PNS 
attacks are occurring), the signal and decoy state yields should 
be the same for each 𝑛-photon yield regardless of its state. For 
example, 𝑌1
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑌1
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
 should always be true for a given 
QKD architecture because the signal and decoy state yields 
(i.e., 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑌0 + 𝜂𝑛) are primarily based on fixed quantum 
efficiencies and not the state type. If ever 𝑌1
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 ≠ 𝑌1
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
, an 
eavesdropper is assumed to be actively listening on the key 
distribution channel and the secret key is assumed 
compromised. While [21] also proposes an error-based 
condition 𝑒𝑛
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑒𝑛
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
, it is not considered in this work 
since the PNS attack does not introduce additional errors [15]. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 Table III provides a chronological listing of practically-
oriented decoy state protocol experiments. From this 
comprehensive survey, there is relatively little consistency 
amongst protocol configurations as signal state MPNs range 
from 0.27 to 0.80 and decoy state MPNs range from 0.08 to 
0.20. Additionally, it is worthwhile to note that this 
inconsistency exists despite Ma et al.’s 2005 work where he 
proved the optimal signal state MPN ≅ 0.5 and the decoy state 
MPN ≅ 0.1 [22]. Similarly, there is considerable disparity in 
the protocol occurrence percentages with signal states ranging 
from 50% to ~99%, decoy states ranging from <1% to 40%, 
and vacuum states ranging from 0% to 25%. 
Despite the decoy state protocol’s wide-spread employment, 
its effectiveness in detecting PNS attacks has not been 
thoroughly addressed in the literature. For example, in his 
defining work on the decoy state protocol, Lo states “Any 
attack by Eve that will change the value of any one of the 𝑌𝑛’s 
and 𝑒𝑛’s substantially will, in principle, be caught with high 
probability by our decoy state method” [21]. Likewise, in the 
most detailed treatment available on the topic, the author 
merely states “significant deviation of the measured ratio from 
this expected value indicates a PNS by Eve” [43]. 
A. Problem Formulation and Research Questions 
 As the decoy state protocol is often employed in high 
performance QKD systems, and particularly the most 
impressive technology demonstrations to date (in terms of 
delivered key rate [26] and network size [27]), there is a need 
to understand its security effectiveness more fully. Moreover, 
it is important for system developers and users to understand 
how the protocol can be optimized to maximize both quantum 
throughput for secret key generation and detect PNS attacks 
(and variations thereof) with high confidence. Therefore, it is 
desirable to address the following research questions: 
1) How do the signal and decoy state MPN values affect the 
system’s ability to detect PNS attacks? 
2) How does the difference between the signal and decoy 
state MPN values affect the system’s ability to detect 
PNS attacks? 
3) How do the signal, decoy, and vacuum state occurrence 
percentages affect the system’s ability to detect PNS 
attacks? 
4) How does variation in the generation and detection of 
signal and decoy states affect the system’s ability to 
detect PNS attacks? 
5) How does propagation distance (i.e., loss) affect the 
system’s ability to differentiate between normal behavior 
and physical disturbances indicative of PNS attacks? 
TABLE III 
DECOY STATE ENABLED QKD SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS 
Case 
Signal 
MPN Decoy MPN 
Occurrence  
Percentage 
(𝜇 / 𝜈 / 𝑌0 ) 
Propagation 
Distance 
(km) 
Key 
Rate 
(bps) 
1 [44] 0.80 0.12 90 / 10 / 0 15 165 
2 [45] 0.55 0.152 63.5 / 20.3 / 16.2 60 <428* 
3 [46] 0.425 0.204 75 / 25 / 0* 25 5.5k 
4 [47] 0.6 0.2 50 / 40 / 10 75 ~12 
5 [47] 0.6 0.2 50 / 40 / 10 102 ~8 
6 [48] 
7 [48] 
0.487 
0.297 
0.064 
0.099 
83.1 / 12.3 / 4.6 
83.1 / 12.3 / 4.6 
85 
100 
~28 
~2 
8 [49] 0.27 0.39 87 / 9 / 4 144 ~13 
9 [50] 0.55 0.098 93 / 6.2 / 1.6 20 10k 
10 [51] 0.48 0.16 93 / 6.2 / 1.6 25 5.7k 
11 [52] 0.55 0.10 80 / 16 / 4 20 1.02M 
12 [53] 0.57 0.13 70 / 20 / 10 140 ~2 
13 [54] 0.65 0.08 75 / 12.5 / 12.5 20 1.5k 
14 [54] 0.60 0.20 75 / 12.5 / 12.5 20 1.6k 
15 [55] 0.6 0.2 50 / 25 / 25 200 11.8 
16 [56] 0.6 0.2 50 / 25 / 25 200 15 
17 [57]  0.5 0.1 98.83 / 0.78 / 0.39 50 1.002M 
18 [58] 0.6 0.2 75 / 12.5 / 12/5 8-60** 1.2-4.5k** 
19 [27] 0.65 0.1 87.5 / 6.25 / 6.25 30–80** 0.8-16k** 
20 [26] 0.4 0.04 98 / 1.5 / 0.5 45 300k 
* Value estimated or assumed from reference. 
**Multiple systems employed.  
B. Experimental Design 
From the comprehensive listing of decoy state 
configurations captured in Table III, and detailed 
understanding of the decoy state protocol, five experimental 
factors are identified as shown in Table IV. First, operational 
distances of 20 and 50 km are selected to represent common 
metropolitan network lengths and long-haul backbone links. 
For those not familiar with quantum communication, losses of 
~0.2 dB per km in single mode fiber significantly limit 
propagation distances where 20 km equates to 4 dB loss (or 
40% efficiency) and 50 km equates to 10 dB loss (or 10% 
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efficiency) [1]. Next, signal and decoy MPNs representative of 
normal and high configurations are chosen for examination. 
As the main focus of this study, five occurrence percentage 
configurations are selected for analysis. Lastly, each treatment 
is examined during normal conditions and when subject to 
PNS attacks. All other design and configuration settings are 
held constant (described in Section III-C). 
TABLE IV 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Operational 
Distance 
Signal 
MPN 
Decoy 
MPN 
Occurrence Percentage 
(Signal/Decoy/Vacuum) 
PNS 
attack 
20 km 0.5 0.1 60 / 30 / 10 No 
50 km 0.8 0.2 70 / 20 / 10 Yes 
   80 / 10 / 10  
   90 / 5 / 5  
   99/0.5/0.5  
     
For this study a full factorial design was selected, as it is 
relatively easy to evaluate all 80 treatments in a simulation 
environment. In order to well characterize the system’s 
behavior, and make statistically significant conclusions, 1,000 
runs are executed for each treatment using the DoD’s High 
Performance Computing Modernization Program at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base. 
Regarding this experimental design, it is important to note 
that 20 km does not necessarily provide a sufficient loss 
budget for Eve to conduct PNS attacks without negatively 
impacting Bob’s expected detection rate [59]. This is because 
Eve introduces loss on the quantum channel as she blocks all 
the single photon pulses sent by Alice. For example, Eve 
introduces ~7.4 dB loss against an MPN of 0.5, whereas the 
20 km link only provides a ~4 dB loss budget for Eve to take 
advantage of with her lossless quantum teleportation channel. 
Despite this constraint, analyzing the decoy state protocol’s 
ability to detect PNS attacks at this distance is desirable 
because many implementations have operational distances of 
15-25 km as noted in Table III. Moreover, if Eve is able to 
insert herself on the quantum channel before protocol 
calibration, her presence would go unnoticed with respect to 
loss and key rate.  
C. Research Model 
In this study, Alice is configured to generate signal, decoy, 
and vacuum pulses according to the decoy state protocol and 
BB84 polarization based prepare and measure protocol as 
described above. In particular, Alice is programmed to 
randomly prepare signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses according 
to the prescribed occurrence percentages at a 5 MHz pulse rate 
with commercially representative laser fluctuations. Alice then 
transmits the prepared pulses through the appropriate 20 or 
50 km quantum channel, which has 4 or 10 dB loss 
respectively and induced physical disturbances. Bob’s model 
includes 3.5 dB loss and representations of commercially 
available Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD) detectors each 
configured with 10% detector efficiency, a 5E-6 dark count 
rate (spontaneous detections when no photons are present), 
and a 0.01 after pulse rate (erroneous detections following a 
successful detection). 
The research model was developed in a simulation 
framework specifically designed to capture and study the 
security and performance impact of implementation non-
idealities in QKD systems, algorithms, and protocols [60]. For 
example, performance and security limitations with respect to 
speed, accuracy, and environmental disturbances are captured 
in the modeled laser source, decoy state generator, pulse 
modulator, quantum channel, and APD detectors. The decoy 
state enabled BB84 QKD model was developed in three 
increments each with increasing capability. The first 
increment provided a hardware-focused QKD notional 
architecture built in a modular fashion from a library of optical 
and electro-optical components [60]. The second increment 
added the processes and logic required to execute the decoy 
state protocol [61], [62]. In the third increment, modeled 
components were extended and the PNS attack was 
implemented [17]. Throughout model development, 
considerable effort was spent thoroughly defining, 
decomposing, modeling, verifying, and validating the decoy 
state enabled QKD model with each optical component 
verified against commercial specifications see Appendix of 
[60] and [63]. Additionally, the model was validated against 
eight fielded QKD systems [61] with additional modeling and 
simulation details presented in Section IV.  
The research model allows analysts to uniquely study the 
security profile of the decoy state protocol (and other QKD 
protocols) in ways that are difficult or impossible with 
conventional means. For example, the model enables detailed 
analysis of the PNS attack which cannot yet be fully realized 
with current technologies [15], [16]. Moreover, the model 
uniquely enables detailed examination of each multiphoton 
pulse generated by Alice to determine if it is successfully split 
by Eve and detected by Bob. Thus, the researcher is able to 
explicitly know which pulses are compromised yet contribute 
to the QKD-generated secret key bits. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this section, the decoy state protocol’s ability to detect 
PNS attacks is examined. First, the efficiency based method of 
detecting PNS attacks is explained, including expected 
operational variations from non-ideal optical components and 
processes. Next, simulation results for several common decoy 
state protocol configurations are described. Based on these 
results, an optimization of the decoy state protocol is 
presented and demonstrated. Lastly, implementation security 
guidance is offered for decoy state enabled QKD systems. 
A. Detecting PNS Attacks 
Despite the creativeness of Eve’s PNS attack, her 
detectability is based on the decoy state protocol’s ability to 
differentiate between subtle changes in the signal and decoy 
states. In lieu of comparing photon number dependent yields 
𝑌𝑛
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙
, 𝑌𝑛
𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦
 which are only measurable with expensive 
Photon Number Resolving (PNR) detectors [64], this study 
utilizes the efficiency based security condition [65] 
𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 (4) 
where 𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙  is the signal state efficiency and 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 is the 
decoy state efficiency. The efficiency based decoy state 
security method directly compares the signal and decoy state 
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efficiencies from readily available measurements instead of 
requiring advanced technologies. The signal (and decoy) state 
efficiency is defined as  
𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 =
−ln|1 + Y0 − 𝑄𝜇|
𝜇
 
(5) 
where 𝑌0 is the system’s measured dark count rate defined as 
Y0 =
Number of vacuum state detections
Number of vacuum state pulses sent
 (6) 
𝑄𝜇 is the measured signal state gain defined as 
𝑄𝜇 =
Number of signal state detections
Number of signal state pulses sent
 (7) 
and 𝜇 is the signal state’s prescribed MPN (typically 0.5). This 
method also allows the QKD system to assure the quantum 
channel is free from unwanted attacks without a priori 
knowledge such as a well-characterized quantum channel as 
required in prior art. 
B. Expected Variation in the Decoy State Protocol 
Due to non-ideal devices, physical disturbances, and 
probabilistic single photon sources, variations are expected in 
the protocol’s operation. These variations directly impact the 
system’s ability to detect PNS attacks and must be accounted 
for, thus, the security condition becomes 
𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 ± Δ (8) 
where Δ represents the protocol’s expected variation during 
quantum exchange. Variation in the decoy state efficiency is 
primarily considered because it exhibits significantly more 
variation than the signal state due to its reduced occurrence 
percentage and lower MPN. 
 While there are many potential sources of variation (e.g., 
fluctuations in laser sources, polarization dependent losses, 
variations in decoy state MPNs, temperature changes, physical 
disturbances, unstable detector efficiencies, etc.), many of 
them can be ignored due to the rapid propagation of photons 
through optical fiber (i.e., 2/3 the speed of light ≈ 2𝑥108 m/s). 
More explicitly, quantum exchange rounds (i.e., 100,000 
signal state detections [66]) are typically very short (e.g.,                 
< 20𝑥10-3 s) and many of these effects are orders of 
magnitude slower (e.g., temperature change due to direct 
sunlight). Thus, Alice’s pulse-to-pulse variation is of primary 
interest, and specifically, variation in her laser source (e.g., a 
commercially available id300 pulsed laser [67]) and decoy 
state generator (e.g., an electronically controlled Variable 
Optical Attenuator (VOA) used to control the MPN of each 
signal, decoy, and vacuum pulse [68]). 
Fig. 3 illustrates Alice’s modeled variation when calibrated 
to produce weak coherent optical pulses with an MPN of 0.55. 
Because of the large number of pulses, the 99.9% Prediction 
Interval (PI) characterizes her expected MPN variation well. 
This means, Alice will generate pulses with an MPN between 
0.49 and 0.61 nearly 100% of the time. Thus, variations in 
generating signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses should be 
expected and addressed when considering the effectiveness of 
the decoy state protocol in detecting PNS attacks. 
 
Fig. 3. Variation in weak coherent pulse MPN emitted from Alice due to laser 
fluctuations and decoy state performance limitations. 
C. Studying Detection Results 
Fig. 4 illustrates the normal operating conditions for 20 
configurations over an operational distance of 20 km (the 
50 km results are not shown because they are very similar). 
The results are grouped with respect to signal and decoy 
MPNs with each treatment labeled by signal-decoy-vacuum 
occurrence percentages. The overlapping box plots imply 
𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦; thus, the system is operating in a secure 
state. Of note, variation in the signal state remains relatively 
fixed, while variation in the decoy state increases as the 
occurrence percentage lessens from 30% to 0.5%. Likewise, 
the lower MPN (i.e., 0.1 compared to 0.2) results in slightly 
more variation in each configuration. This occurs because less 
decoy states are sent by Alice, and therefore, detected by Bob, 
causing more variation. In all 40 configurations studied 
without PNS attacks at both 20 and 50 km, the signal and 
decoy state efficiencies are overlapping with no statistically 
significant differentiation. 
Fig. 5 illustrates results over the 50 km operational distance 
from 20 configurations when subject to PNS attacks (the 
20 km results are not shown because they are very similar). 
For each configuration studied, there is a clear separation 
between the decoy state efficiencies and the signal state 
efficiencies. This is because Eve inadvertently blocks most of 
the decoy state pulses since a majority of them contain only a 
single photon due to its lower MPN. Conversely, relatively 
few signal state pulses are blocked since the higher MPN 
generates more multi-photon pulses. Thus, Eve significantly 
reduces the decoy state efficiency and slightly elevates the 
signal state efficiency to compensate for Bob’s expected 
detection rate. This behavior is precisely why the decoy state 
protocol requires two different MPNs in otherwise 
indistinguishable states (i.e., Eve is unaware of the pulse type, 
since any of the pulse states could consist of 0, 1, or ≥2 
photons). Additionally, as can be seen in the downward 
trending efficiencies, these responses are tempered by the 
protocol’s occurrence percentages and Eve’s gain matching. 
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Fig. 4. Simulation results are shown for the for the 20 km decoy state protocol configurations examined when operating under normal conditions. In each 
configuration studied, the signal and decoy state efficiencies are the same 𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 ± Δ (within expected variation tolerances). 
 
Fig. 5. Simulation results are shown for the 50 km decoy state protocol configurations examined when subject to PNS attacks. In each configuration studied, the 
signal and decoy state efficiencies are statistically different 𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 ≠ 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 ± Δ (outside expected variation tolerances). 
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In the 40 configurations considered at both 20 and 50 km 
distances, the PNS attack was successfully detected in all 
40,000 trials (i.e., 1,000 trials in each of the 40 configurations 
studied). For example, in the worst case scenario, when the 
signal and decoy state MPNs are closest (0.5 and 0.2) with the 
least amount of decoy states (99% signal, 0.5% decoy, and 
0.5% vacuum) and the most loss (10 dB loss over the 50 km 
channel), there is very strong statistical evidence that 
𝜂𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 ≠ 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑦 ± Δ with 𝑃 < 0.001. These results 
demonstrate the decoy state protocol’s ability to detect PNS 
attacks across a wide set of commonly implemented 
configurations, and perhaps more importantly, they 
demonstrate that the protocol can be further optimized as 
identified by the large “white space” between the signal and 
decoy states efficiencies in Fig. 5. 
D. Optimization for Performance and Security 
While the decoy state protocol has been optimized with 
respect to MPNs contributing to secret key distribution [22], 
the protocol has not been optimized for detecting PNS attacks. 
Hence, we provide an optimization which assures high 
security confidence and allows the protocol’s performance to 
be maximized based on a detailed study of signal and decoy 
state MPNs and occurrence percentages, as well as, design 
decisions and architectural considerations. 
From this study we learn that the protocol’s ability to detect 
PNS attacks is primarily controlled by losses due to each 
state’s occurrence percentage, MPN, and the end-to-end 
quantum communication path. More specifically, to detect 
PNS attacks in real-time with high confidence only a few 
decoy state detections are necessary during each round of 
quantum exchange (i.e., a predetermined number of 
detections). For example, the decoy state protocol can be 
configured to perform the PNS attack check after each round 
of 100,000 detections. Furthermore, we learn that an 
arbitrarily high level of confidence (e.g., >99.9%) is possible 
because statistical confidence is increased through multiple 
rounds of quantum exchange and not the number of decoy 
state detections per round. 
In order to optimize the decoy state protocol, the developer 
should choose the highest signal state occurrence percentage 
possible, while meeting the minimum number of decoy state 
detections to reliably detect PNS attacks (i.e., choose the 
minimal decoy occurrence percentage possible). Assuming the 
suggested MPNs of Ma et al. are used (𝜇 = 0.5, 𝜈 = 0.1) [22], 
the optimized decoy state protocol configuration can be 
described in a system of equations. First, the signal state 
occurrence percentage 𝑆𝜇 should be as a close to unity as 
possible 
𝑆𝜇 → 1 (9) 
where 𝑆𝜇 is limited by the decoy and vacuum state occurrence 
percentages 𝑆𝜈, 𝑆𝑌0 , respectively 
𝑆𝜇 = 1 − 𝑆𝜈 − 𝑆𝑌0 . (10) 
Accordingly, it is advantageous to minimize both 𝑆𝜈 and 𝑆𝑌0; 
however, the decoy state occurrence percentage 𝑆𝜈 must be 
high enough to effectively differentiate between noise on the 
quantum channel and a PNS attack where the decoy state gain 
𝑄𝜈 must exceed the system’s measured dark count rate 𝑌0  
𝑄𝜈 > 𝑌0. (11) 
This condition implies at least one decoy state detection 𝑁𝜈 
per round of quantum exchange which is not due to a dark 
count (i.e., a signal to noise ratio >1).  
Thus, the optimized decoy state configuration can be further 
clarified 
𝑆𝜈 ≪ 1 (12) 
𝑁𝜈 ≥ 1. (13) 
For a given architecture, the optimized decoy state protocol 
can be determined from the minimum number of decoy state 
detections 𝑁𝜈, the desired number of signal state detections 
𝑁𝜇, the signal and decoy state gains 𝑄𝜇, 𝑄𝜈, and their 
occurrence percentages 𝑆𝜇, 𝑆𝜈 where 
𝑁𝜈 = 𝑆𝜈𝑄𝜈𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 (14) 
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 =
𝑁𝜇
𝑆𝜇𝑄𝜇
 (15) 
𝑆𝜈 =
𝑁𝜈𝑆𝜇𝑄𝜇
𝑄𝜈𝑁𝜇 
. (16) 
While the necessary parameters for optimization are readily 
available, in order maximize performance the system’s 
architecture must be well-characterized in the desired 
operational environment. This is because the decoy state 
protocol is being configured to operate at its minimum 
threshold and is extremely sensitive to implementation non-
idealities and performance variations to include Alice’s ability 
to generate weak coherent pulses, losses in the quantum 
channel, physical disturbances, detector efficiency, and 
particularly the system’s operational dark count rate. 
E. Example Optimization 
 In this section, an optimization of a fielded decoy state 
enabled QKD system is demonstrated. As one of the most well 
documented decoy state protocol implementations and a major 
milestone in the world’s largest QKD network, Chen et al.’s 
work lends itself well to detailed analysis [54]. The protocol’s 
configuration is provided in Table V. 
TABLE V 
DECOY STATE PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION [58] 
Protocol Configuration Operational Results 
𝑆𝜇 = 0.75 𝜂 = 0.00985 
𝑆𝜈 = 0.125 𝑄𝜇 = 6.36E-3 
𝑆𝑌0 = 0.125 𝑄𝜈 = 8.61E-4 
𝜇 = 0.65  𝑌0 = 1.0E-4 
𝜈 = 0.08  
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Assuming 𝑁𝜇 = 100,000 detections per quantum exchange 
and an arbitrarily small vacuum state occurrence percentage 
𝑆𝑌0 = 0.005, the decoy state protocol occurrence percentages 
can be optimized to 𝑆𝜇 = 0.99435, 𝑆𝜈 = 0.00065 using the 
approach described in Eqs. (9-16). This optimized 
configuration is particularly advantageous as it results in a 
>30% increase in key distribution (i.e., a signal state 
occurrence percentage 99.435% instead of 75%) and the 
ability to detect PNS attack with 99.9% confidence at no 
additional cost. 
 Fig. 6 presents detailed results of the optimized protocol 
while operating under normal conditions and when subject to 
PNS attacks. Shown on the left, during normal operations the 
signal and decoy state efficiencies (blue and red) overlap as 
expected. Shown in the middle, PNS attacks cause the signal 
and decoy state efficiencies (green and purple) to become non-
overlapping. In particular, since the protocol is configured to 
operate with a minimum number of decoy state detections, the 
PNS attack reduces the decoy state from a small number of 
detections to zero during nearly every round of quantum 
exchange. This results in a reported decoy state mean 
efficiency of 0.000 with relatively little variation (see Fig. 7 
for further details). Consequently, the optimized decoy state 
protocol configuration serves to emphasize the negative 
impact of the PNS attack by forcing the decoy state’s 
efficiency below the measured dark count rate (shown in 
brown with a detailed inlay) because so few decoy state 
detections are expected per round of quantum exchange. 
 
Fig. 6. Simulation results show the optimized decoy state protocol for 
detecting PNS attacks based on the fielded QKD system [54]. 
Fig. 7 displays the number of decoy state detections per 
round of quantum exchange during normal operations (shown 
in green) and when subject to PNS attacks (shown in red). 
During normal operations, the optimized configuration results 
in at least one decoy state detection per 100,000 detections and 
a mean of 9 detections. Conversely, only a few decoy state 
detections are expected during PNS attacks; however, they are 
statistical outliers occurring in only 134 out of the 1,000 
rounds of quantum exchange. In terms of efficiency, the mean 
decoy state efficiency is 0.0096 during normal operations and 
drops to 0.0013 during PNS attacks. As a result, the PNS 
attack is readily detectable with a high statistical confidence of 
𝑃 < 0.001 when considering 1,000 rounds of quantum 
exchange with 100,000 detections per round. 
 While the decoy state occurrence percentage 𝑆𝜈 can be 
further reduced, statistical significance begins to diminish 
because the number of decoy state detections per round of 
quantum exchange approaches zero during normal operations. 
Moreover, as the occurrence percentage is further reduced the 
protocol’s integrity is jeopardized as the decoy state gain must 
be larger than the system’s dark count rate (i.e., 𝑄𝜈 > 𝑌0). 
 
Fig. 7. Simulation results detailing the number of decoy state detections per 
round of quantum exchange for the optimized decoy state protocol based on 
the fielded QKD system in [54]. 
F. Implementation Recommendations 
In addition to the protocol optimization described above and 
the findings therein, this research effort led to several design 
and implementation recommendations for commercially viable 
QKD systems: 
1) Upon system startup, the decoy state protocol should be 
configured to quickly perform initial security checks to 
ensure the quantum channel is free from PNS attacks. For 
example, 1,000 rounds of quantum exchange can be 
executed in a relatively short amount of time during 
initial calibration activities. 
2) Configure the decoy state protocol to continuously 
monitor for PNS attacks in real-time and over several 
rounds of quantum exchange to increase confidence in 
the system’s security. 
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3) The noise level (i.e., the dark count rate) should be 
measured during dedicated calibration activities with very 
large numbers of vacuum signals (e.g., ≥109) intermixed 
with signal and decoy states to well-characterize the 
operational environment and system architecture. 
4) During operation, the dark count rate should be compared 
to the calibration results in order to detect changes in the 
operational environment such as temperature changes or 
additional physical disturbances. 
5) Minimize the vacuum state occurrence percentage but do 
not eliminate it. The state it can be used as an indicator to 
monitor for attacks such as the blinding attack [69]. 
Additionally, while Ma et al.’s work optimized the signal state 
MPN at ~0.5, users may want to consider higher signal state 
MPNs such as those successfully demonstrated in the world’s 
largest QKD network (i.e., 𝜇 = 0.65) [27]. Moreover, past 
work on the subject recommends MPNs on the order of 1.0 - 
1.2 based on pragmatic technical assumptions [70].  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, the ability of the decoy state enabled QKD 
systems to detect PNS attacks is analyzed and demonstrated. 
In contrast to most decoy state protocol research, this work 
focuses on the optimization of the protocol’s occurrence 
percentages to both maximize secret key rates and assure PNS 
attacks are detectable with high confidence. Additionally, 
practical implementation performance and security guidance is 
provided for system developers and users. Lastly, this work 
demonstrates a repeatable methodology for studying QKD 
systems to support formal certification efforts [71]. 
Future suggested work includes optimization of the decoy 
state protocol in a QKD system for validation, and perhaps, 
tested against a PNS or PNS-like attack as suggested in [16]. 
DISCLAIMER 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United 
States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. 
References 
[1]  N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel and H. Zbinden, "Quantum 
cryptography," Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 145-195, 
2002.  
[2]  V. Scarani and C. Kurtsiefer, "The black paper of quantum cryptography: 
real implementation problems," arXiv:0906.4547v2, 2009.  
[3]  L. Oesterling, D. Hayford and G. Friend, "Comparison of commercial 
and next generation quantum key distribution: Technologies for secure 
communication of information," in Homeland Security (HST), 2012 
IEEE Conference on Technologies for, 2012.  
[4]  V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf, M. Dušek, N. 
Lütkenhaus and M. Peev, "The security of practical quantum key 
distribution," Reviews of Modern Physics, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 1301-1350, 
2009.  
[5]  L. O. Mailloux, M. R. Grimaila, D. D. Hodson, G. Baumgartner and C. 
McLaughlin, "Performance evaluations of quantum key distribution 
system architectures," IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 30-
40, 2015.  
[6]  C. Elliott, "Quantum cryptography," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 2, no. 
4, pp. 57-61, 2004.  
[7]  B. Qi, L. Qian and H.-K. Lo, "A brief introduction of quantum 
cryptography for engineers," arXiv: 1002.1237, 2010.  
[8]  S. Wiesner, "Conjugate coding," ACM Sigact News, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 
78-88, 1983.  
[9]  C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, "Quantum cryptography: public key 
distribution and coin tossing," in Proceedings of IEEE International 
Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, 1984.  
[10]  G. S. Vernam, "Cipher printing telegraph systems for secret wire and 
radio telegraphic communications," American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers, Transactions of the, vol. 45, pp. 295-301, 1926.  
[11]  C. E. Shannon, "Communication theory of secrecy systems," Bell System 
Technical Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656-715, 1949.  
[12]  Quantum Cryptography Conference, "QCrypt 2015," 2016. [Online]. 
Available: 2015.qcrypt.net. 
[13]  D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lutkenhaus and J. Preskill, "Security of 
quantum key distribution with imperfect devices," in In Information 
Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004. Proceedings. International Symposium on, 
2004.  
[14]  R. Renner, N. Gisin and B. Kraus, "An information-theoretic security 
proof for QKD protocols," Physical Review A, vol. 72, no. 1, p. 012332, 
2005.  
[15]  G. Brassard, N. Lutkenhaus, T. Mor and B. C. Sanders, "Limitations on 
practical quantum cryptography," Physical Review Letters, vol. 85, no. 6, 
p. 1330, 2000.  
[16]  N. Lütkenhaus, "Security against individual attacks for realistic quantum 
key distribution," Physical Review A, vol. 61, no. 5, p. 052304, 2000.  
[17]  L. Mailloux, D. Hodson, M. Grimaila, R. Engle, C. McLaughlin and G. 
Baumgartner, "Using modeling and simulation to study photon number 
splitting attacks," IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 2188-2197, 2016.  
[18]  S. Loepp and W. K. Wootters, Protecting Information, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
[19]  G. Nogues, A. Rauschenbeutel, S. Osnaghi, M. Brune, J. M. Raimond 
and S. Haroche, "Seeing a single photon without destroying it," Nature, 
vol. 400, no. 6741, pp. 239-242, 1999.  
[20]  W.-Y. Hwang, "Quantum key distribution with high loss: toward global 
secure communication," Physical Review Letters, vol. 91, no. 5, p. 
057901, 2003.  
[21]  H.-K. Lo, X. Ma and K. Chen, "Decoy state quantum key distribution," 
Physical Review Letters, vol. 94, no. 3, p. 230504, 2005.  
[22]  X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao and H.-K. Lo, "Practical decoy state for quantum 
key distribution," Physical Review, vol. 72, no. 1, p. 012326, 2005.  
[23]  X.-B. Wang, "Beating the photon-number-splitting attack in practical 
quantum cryptography," Physical Review Letters, vol. 94, no. 23, p. 
230503, 2005.  
[24]  X.-B. Wang, "Decoy-state protocol for quantum cryptography with four 
different intensities of coherent light," Physical Review A, vol. 72, no. 1, 
p. 012322, 2005.  
[25]  J. W. Harrington, J. M. Ettinger, R. J. Hughes and J. E. Nordholt, 
"Enhancing practical security of quantum key distribution with a few 
decoy states," arXiv, pp. quant-ph/0503002, 2005.  
[26]  A. R. Dixon, J. F. Dynes, M. Lucamarini, B. Fröhlich, A. W. Sharpe, A. 
Plews, S. Tam and e. al., "High speed prototype quantum key distribution 
system and long term field trial," Optics Express, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 
7583-7592, 2015.  
[27]  S. Wang, W. Chen, Z.-Q. Yin, H.-W. Li, D.-Y. He, Y.-H. Li, Z. Zhou and 
e. al., "Field and long-term demonstration of a wide area quantum key 
distribution network," Optics Express, vol. 22, no. 18, pp. 21739-21756, 
2014.  
[28]  X.-B. Wang, C.-Z. Peng and J.-W. Pan, "Simple protocol for secure 
decoy-state quantum key distribution with a loosely controlled source," 
arXiv:quant-ph/0609137, 2006.  
[29]  X.-B. Wang, "Secure and efficient decoy-state quantum key distribution 
with inexact pulse intensities," arXiv:quant-ph/0609081, 2006.  
[30]  W. Mauerer and C. Silberhorn, "Quantum key distribution with passive 
decoy state selection," Physical Review A, vol. 75, no. 5, p. 050305, 
2007.  
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
11 
[31]  M. Hayashi, "General theory for decoy-state quantum key distribution 
with an arbitrary number of intensities," New Journal of Physics, vol. 9, 
no. 8, p. 284, 2007.  
[32]  X.-B. Wang, C.-Z. Peng and J.-W. Pan, "Simple protocol for secure 
decoy-state quantum key distribution with a loosely controlled source," 
Applied Physics Letters, vol. 90, no. 3, p. 031110, 2007.  
[33]  T. Tsurumaru, A. Soujaeff and S. Takeuchi, "Exact minimum and 
maximum of yield with a finite number of decoy light intensities," 
Physical Review A, vol. 77, no. 2, p. 022319, 2008.  
[34]  X.-B. Wang, L. Yang, C.-Z. Peng and J.-W. Pan, "Decoy-state quantum 
key distribution with both source errors and statistical fluctuations," New 
Journal of Physics, vol. 11, no. 7, p. 075006, 2009.  
[35]  J.-Z. Hu and X.-B. Wang, "Reexamination of the decoy-state quantum 
key distribution with an unstable source," Physical Review A, vol. 82, no. 
1, p. 012331, 2010.  
[36]  J.-Z. Hu and X.-B. Wang, "Secure quantum key distribution in an easy 
way," arXiv:1004.3730, 2010.  
[37]  B. W.-s. Yuan Li, H.-w. Li, C. Zhou and Y. Wang, "Passive decoy-state 
quantum key distribution for the weak coherent photon source with 
intensity fluctuations," arXiv:1312.7383 [quant-ph], 2013.  
[38]  B. W.-s. Yuan Li, H.-w. Li, C. Zhou and Y. Wang, "Passive decoy-state 
quantum key distribution for the weak coherent photon source with 
intensity fluctuations," arXiv:1312.7383 [quant-ph], 2013.  
[39]  Q.-C. Sun, W.-L. Wang, Y. Liu, F. Zhou, J. Pelc, M. M. Fejer, C.-Z. Peng 
and e. al., "Experimental passive decoy-state quantum key distribution," 
Laser Physics Letters, vol. 11, no. 8, p. 085202, 2014.  
[40]  J. Hasegawa, M. Hayashi, T. Hiroshima, A. Tanaka and A. Tomita, 
"Experimental decoy state quantum key distribution with unconditional 
security incorporating finite statistics," arXiv:0705.3081, 2007.  
[41]  M. Lucamarini, K. A. Patel, J. F. Dynes, B. Fröhlich, A. W. Sharpe, A. R. 
Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, R. V. Penty and A. J. Shields, "Efficient decoy-state 
quantum key distribution with quantified security," Optics express , vol. 
21, no. 21, pp. 24550-24565, 2013.  
[42]  C. C. W. Lim, M. Curty, N. Walenta, F. Xu and H. Zbinden, "Concise 
security bounds for practical decoy-state quantum key distribution," 
Physical Review A, vol. 89, no. 2, p. 022307, 2014.  
[43]  Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shields, "Unconditionally secure one-
way quantum key distribution using decoy pulses," Applied physics 
letters, vol. 90, no. 1, p. 011118, 2007.  
[44]  Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo and L. Qian, "Experimental quantum 
key distribution with decoy states," Physical Review Letters, vol. 96, no. 
7, p. 070502, 2006.  
[45]  Y. Zhao, B. Qi, X. Ma, H.-K. Lo and L. Qian, "Simulation and 
implementation of decoy state quantum key distribution over 60km 
telecom fiber," in Information Theory, 2006 IEEE International 
Symposium on, 2006.  
[46]  Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shields, "Unconditionally secure one-
way quantum key distribution using decoy pulses," arXiv:quant-
ph/0610015, 2006.  
[47]  C.-Z. Peng, J. Zhang, D. Yang, W.-B. Gao, H.-X. Ma, H. Yin, H.-P. Zeng, 
T. Yang, X.-B. Wang and J.-W. Pan, "Experimental long-distance decoy-
state quantum key distribution based on polarization encoding," Physical 
Review Letters, vol. 98, no. 1, p. 010505, 2007.  
[48]  D. Rosenberg, J. W. Harrington, P. R. Rice, P. A. Hiskett, C. G. Peterson, 
R. J. Hughes, A. E. Lita, S. W. Nam and J. E. Nordholt, "Long-distance 
decoy-state quantum key distribution in optical fiber," Physical Review 
Letters, vol. 98, no. 1, p. 010503, 2007.  
[49]  T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, M. Fürst, R. Ursin, F. Tiefenbacher, T. 
Scheidl, J. Perdigues and e. al., "Experimental demonstration of free-
space decoy-state quantum key distribution over 144 km," Physical 
Review Letters, vol. 98, no. 1, p. 010504, 2007.  
[50]  J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shields, "Practical 
quantum key distribution over 60 hours at an optical fiber distance of 
20km using weak and vacuum decoy pulses for enhanced security," 
Optics Express, vol. 15, no. 13, pp. 8465-8471, 2007.  
[51]  J. F. Dynes, Z. L. Yuan, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shields, "Decoy pulse 
quantum key distribution for practical purposes," Optoelectronics, IET, 
vol. 2, no. 5, pp. 195-200, 2008.  
[52]  A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shield, 
"Gigahertz decoy quantum key distribution with 1 Mbit/s secure key 
rate," Optics Express, vol. 16, no. 23, pp. 18790-18979, 2008.  
[53]  D. Rosenberg, C. G. Peterson, J. W. Harrington, P. R. Rice, N. Dallmann, 
K. T. Tyagi, K. P. McCabe and e. al., "Practical long-distance quantum 
key distribution system using decoy levels," New Journal of Physics, vol. 
11, no. 4, p. 045009, 2009.  
[54]  T.-Y. Chen, H. Liang, Y. Liu, W.-Q. Cai, L. Ju, W.-Y. Liu, J. Wang, H. 
Yin, K. Chen, Z.-B. Chen, C.-Z. Peng and J.-W. Pan, "Field test of a 
practical secure communication network with decoy-state quantum 
cryptography," Optics Express, vol. 17, no. 8, pp. 6540-6549, 2009.  
[55]  T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, Y. Liu, W.-Q. Cai, X. Wan, L.-K. Chen, J.-H. Wang 
and e. al., "200km Decoy-state quantum key distribution with photon 
polarization," arXiv, p. arXiv:0908.4063, 2009.  
[56]  Y. Liu, T.-Y. Chen, J. Wang, W.-Q. Cai, X. Wan, L.-K. Chen, J.-H. Wang 
and e. al., "Decoy-state quantum key distribution with polarized photons 
over 200 km," Optics Express, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 8587-8594, 2010.  
[57]  A. R. Dixon, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes, A. W. Sharpe and A. J. Shields, 
"Continuous operation of high bit rate quantum key distribution," 
Applied Physics Letters, vol. 96, no. 16, p. 161102, 2010.  
[58]  T. Chen, J. Wang, H. Liang, W. Liu, Y. Liu, X. Jiang, Y. Wang, X. Wan, 
W. Cai, L. Ju and L. Chen, "Metropolitan all-pass and inter-city quantum 
communication network," Optics Express, vol. 18, no. 26, pp. 27217-
27225, 2010.  
[59]  N. Lütkenhaus and M. Jahma, "Quantum key distribution with realistic 
states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack," 
New Journal of Physics, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 44.1–44.9, 2002.  
[60]  L. O. Mailloux, J. D. Morris, M. R. Grimaila, D. D. Hodson, D. R. 
Jacques, J. M. Colombi, C. McLaughlin, R. Engle and J. Holes, "A 
modeling framework for studying quantum key distribution system 
implementation non-idealities," IEEE Access, vol. 3, pp. 110-130, 2015.  
[61]  L. O. Mailloux, R. D. Engle, M. R. Grimaila, D. D. Hodson and C. 
McLaughlin, "Modeling decoy state quantum key distribution systems," 
The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, 
Methodology, Technology, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 489-506, 2015.  
[62]  R. Engle, M. Grimaila, L. Mailloux, D. Hodson, C. McLaughlin and G. 
Baumgartner, "Implementing the decoy state protocol in a practically-
oriented quantum key distribution system-level model," The Journal of 
Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, 
Technology, Submitted 2016.  
[63]  J. Holes, L. Mailloux, M. Grimaila and D. Hodson, "An Efficient Testing 
Process for a Quantum Key Distribution System Modeling Framework," 
in International Conference on Scientific Computing (CSC15), Las 
Vegas, NV, July 27-30, 2015, 2014.  
[64]  R. H. Hadfield, "Single-photon detectors for optical quantum information 
applications," Nature photonics , vol. 3, no. 12, pp. 696-705, 2009.  
[65]  L. O. Mailloux, M. R. Grimaila, J. M. Colombi, D. D. Hodson, R. D. 
Engle, C. V. McLaughlin and G. Baumgartner, "Quantum key 
distribution: examination of the decoy state protocol," IEEE 
Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 10, pp. 24-31, 2015.  
[66]  A. Mink and A. Nakassis, "LDPC for qkd reconciliation," The 
Computing Science and Technology International Journal, vol. 2, no. 2, 
pp. 6-14, 2012.  
[67]  ID Quantique, "id300 Series Sub-Nanosecond Pulsed Laser Source 
Datasheet," 2012. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.idquantique.com/images/stories/PDF/id300-laser-
source/id300-specs.pdf. [Accessed 05 Mar 2014]. 
[68]  OPLINK, "Electronically Variable Optical Attenuators," 2014. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.oplink.com/pdf/EVOA-S0012.pdf . 
[69]  L. Lydersen, C. Wiechers, C. Wittmann, D. Elser, J. Skaar and V. 
Makarov, "Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by 
tailored bright illumination," Nature Photonics, vol. 4, no. 10, pp. 686-
689, 2010.  
[70]  D. Pearson and C. Elliott, "On the optimal mean photon number for 
quantum cryptography," quant-ph/0403065, 2004.  
[71]  ETSI, "Quantum key distribution," 08 June 2015. [Online]. Available: 
www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/quantum-key-
distribution. 
